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HOW RAISE THE STANDARD OF MORALS FOR
THE LEGAL PROFESSION.
Two Irishmen were strolling through a cemetery.
They chanced upon a tombstone with this inscription carved
upon it, "Here lies Joseph Good, a lawyer and an honest
man." Pat said to Mike, "Faith and there must be two men
buried in one grave." Such was Pat's conception of the legal profession and in large measure it is the conception of
the world. David, in his haste, said, "All men are liars."
The world has modified or revised David's declaration and
says, "All lawyers are liars. Whatever the old notion was
as to the legal profession, we are persuaded that such is not
the holding of the public today of our honorable profession.
The number of honorable, straightforward, upright men in
the profession today is legion and is increasing rapidly.
Even though this be true, there is room for improvement.
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The rapid progress in this direction is due in no small degree to the activities of the bar associations, high class legal publications and the courts the world over in demanding that the bar shall "tone up" morally and fill the place
it should rightfully fill in the body politic.
Why select such a topic for discussion in this magazine?
Is it a live, up-to-date subject? One cannot read the legal
periodicals of the country, the proceedings of bar associations, and the doings of the bar examiners and the courts
which they represent and not come to the conclusion that
this is a very much alive and up-to-the-minute topic or subject and entitled to a place in this Review.
No farther back than the December number of the
American Law School Review there is reprinted from the
October Journal of the American Bar Associato- an article
bearing on a kindred topic covering seven double column
pages. This article was prepared by the Hon. George W.
Wickersham, ex-Attorney General of the United States,
and delivered before the American Bar Association.
Mr. Wickersham begins his address to the Association
with this paragraph :-"The fundamental requirement of a
good moral character on the part of persons seeking admission to the bar is assumed in all regulations, whether by statute or rule of court, in every state of the American Union.
It hardly could be otherwise. The very nature of the re!ation of practitioners of law to the courts before which
they practice, to the clients whose most important interests
are entrusted to them, and to the public to which their obligations increasingly are being recognized, requires sound
moral character and an instinctive recognition of proper
ethical standards. The regulations for admission to the
bar in practically every state begin by providing that a
person of good moral character, possessing other qualifications specified, may be admitted to the practice of law upon
compliance with the specific. regulations."
Mr. Wickersham in this address practically takes as his
text the first parag~aph from an article read before the
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American Bar Association in 1913, by Mr. Clarence A.
Lightner, of the Michigan bar, entitled, "A More Complete
Inquiry Into the Moral Character of Applicants for Admission to the Bar." In this paragraph Mr. Lightner made
these observations :-"The banking and business worlds
have learned that for true success, character counts. Lawyers of intelligence know that this is equally true of the
legal profession, and yet with a sense of helpless indifference or with no sense at all, they, for the most part, neglect
character as an element in legal education, and take no
pains to exclude the ethically unfit from admission to the
profession. The evils resulting from admitting a morally
unfit applicant are not confined to the case in question.
The admission to the bar of one having a low moral standard tends to lower the character of other practitioners and
of the bar in general. Not altogether unlike the 'gang' in
juvenile, experience, the bar of any community has an ethical standard which fairly represents the average of its
membership."
Mr. Wickersham, one of the highest types of representatives of the American bar and American Bar Association
recommends the careful reading of Mr. Lightner's paper
by every member of the profession.
Both Mr. Wickersham and Mr. Lightner discuss the
"toning up" of the bar but both fail in laying down a good
workable method whereby this "devoutly to be wished" result may be attained. We do not claim to be able to supply
in this paper a fully developed plan for obtaining this result, but hope to supply a few hints or suggestions which
may help on toward the desired goal.
This goal will never be reached until the importance
of character is placed upon an equal footing with the knowledge of the law. Morals and brains must be estimated
"fifty-fifty." Then why not put the morals through as rigid a test as the brains? From five to seven men are designated by the law of the various states to examine candidates. These candidates go through four sessions of three
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hours each, answering one hundred to one hundred and
fifty questions on sixteen or eighteen subjects in the law.
The examiners devote from three to six weeks reading over
the answers to these questions to test the intelligence, knowledge and education of these candidates, and they give six
or eight seconds to test the moral status of each one of
them. Is not Mr. Lightner right when he says, "Those examiners act with a sense of helpless indifference, or with no
sense at all?"
However, some one says that the fault is not with the
examiners but with the law which requires so little. With
this objection we are little concerned. The vital thing is
to find the weakness, then correct it, no matter on whom or
how many the fault lies. We are most decided in our opinion that the general method of most states which require
two or three affidavits from as many citizens, two of whom
must be members of the bar, setting forth the fact that
the candidate is of good moral character, is most flimsy,
weak and non-effective.
Every one knows that almost any one can find two or
three persons who will make affidavits or write letters of
"good moral character," thus arming such candidates with
the required evidence. Not only is this true, but such letters or affidavits may be secured from ordinarily conscientious and well meaning people-people who do not purpose
to lie or perjure themselves. Their sympathies and charitable natures are played upon and abused by the persons
applying to them. The writer has been imposed upon in
this manner when he was compelled to throw the mantle
of charity over the faults of the applicants and with words
of advice and hopes of reform, sent them away with the
necessary documents. In doing so he felt like doing as a
certain professor in a college did when he came to sign the
diploma of one of the graduates. He signed with his eyes
shut.
Two years ago in Ohio the Supreme Court and the
board of examiners besides using the. old system noted
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above, resorted to a new and somewhat extempore expedient to get better results. Their plan failed as it might
have been expected. The court was spurred on in its course
by some incidents that took place in the state within five
weeks previous to the bar examination. In that time five
lawyers were disbarred, one of them a woman, anu two
others' cases were pending for a hearing. These events
took place at the psychological moment to arouse the ire
of the examining board. The Court determined to remedy
this state of affairs by guarding the portals of the profession at the entrance end. This was the method adopted;
viz, a week or ten days before the examination, three letters of inquiry were sent out regarding the history, character and conduct of each of the five hundred and three applicants for examination. These letters were sent to attorneys,
ministers, teachers and business men with a questionaire as
to the desirability of these five hundred and three men and
women. Among this great number of applicants one-half
were from Cleveland alone, and of this quota from Cleveland the majority were foreigners. The court decided that
on the face of things many of them were undesirable.
Numbers had been assigned to the applicants in advance
of the examination. On the morning of the first day each
was given a card and told to put his name and number on
it. Such a thing had not been heard of for forty years in
Ohio; numbers alone went on the papers of each applicant.
These cards and the letters to match were brought together
for comparison. As a consequence many of the 60% of
failures for that year were the result of those fifteen hundred and nine letters. Some were failed even before their papers containing answers to questions were looked over. The
letters in these instances did not contain information satisfactory to the committee. One man who failed protested and
wanted to know whether he answered the questions correctly. He was told that his papers were well up near the top
in excellence. He asked why he was not passed, and was
told that his character was too poor.
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The committee apparently graded character on the
basis of 100%. No improvement will be made in the
profession and no check on undesirables will eyer be accomplished until character is placed on an equal footing with
intelligence and ascertained by as rigid a test.
The objection to the spasmodic effort of the Ohio board
was that it began at the wrong time. It was unfair to
the applicants to suffer them to go to law schools or study
under attorneys for three years and then turn them down in
the end. The time to do this is at the beginning when they
first register. When they know what will be required of
them, they will have at least a chance to mend their ways.
Churches have adopted methods of asceitaining the
character and fitness of candidates for the ministry far
more searching than has the bar in getting its recruits.
They have one committee or board of examiners to hold
tests on educational qualifications, another committee on
ministerial relations, or conference relations. This latter
committee makes no farce of its proceedings. The candidate comes before this committee and is subjected to a long,
grueling questionaire, something like the following :-What
is your full name? What was your father's name-mother's
maiden name-parent's nationality? What is your age?
Have you any brothers or sisters? Are you married? How
many are there in your family? Where were you educated?
Do you use tobacco? Do you use intoxicating liquor?
Have you ever used intoxicating liquor? Dou you play
cards? Have you ever played for money? Do you gamble
in any manner? How is your health? Have you ever been
arrested? What for, if so? Are you in harmony with the
doctrines and polity of this church? Will you preach and
adhere to them, or withdraw if ever you get out of harmony
with them? Are you in debt so as to embarrass you in the
work of the ministry? Will you abstain from the use of
tobacco and intoxicating liquors if received as a minister
in this church? Have you ever experienced conversion?
Do you use profane language? Can you give names of sev-
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eral references? What has been your occupation? Give
names of last three employers. What diversions do you
take? Why are you seeking admission to the ministry?
Have or do you feel that you have been called to preach?
These and many others to the same purpose are asked;
besides the committee notes the candor or lack of candor in
the applicant's answers to these questions. His general demeanor toward the committee, his dress and general appearance all are noted in the committee's report. In short
this committee has compelled the candidate to unfold his
life history and it is now ready to report to the main body.
Then the candidate is introduced to the main body to be
given the "once over," and he must run the gauntlet of ballots of the conference or assembly. The report of the committee ends with some kind of recommendation either favorable or unfavorable.
If any member knows the candidate better than any
one else and wishes to divulge things not brought out by the
committee, he has that privilege. So the candidate who has
an unsavory record has a rough road to travel to get into
the ministry. A few get by, however.
Many of the above questions are suitable for applicants to the bar. In addition, the following should be
added; viz, Are you a church member? Do you attend
church?
Have you ever attended
Sunday School,
or any school where they give religious instructions? Have you made a study of the Bible? To what extent have you made this study, if any? Were you ever expelled from school or college? If so, what for? Are you
in harmony with the laws and institutions of this country?
Will you gladly and whole-heartedly take the oath to support
the constitutions of your state and nation? Why are you
seeking admission to the bar? This last question no doubt
will bother the applicant for a while. It is a thought provoker.
Why propound any more of a questionaire? Enough
has been given to indicate the manner of making the test.
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The method is workable, and all that is needed is the right
kind of committees to execute it. Men imbued with the
spirit to uplift and advance the profession of the law, we
think, can get splendid results.
One of the states which is among the more progressive
the doors of the profession is New York, and
guarding
in
it
may
because of the complexity of the candidates.
well
The New York rules require a "committee of practicing attorneys to inquire into the character and fitness of every
applicant for admission to the bar, and make detailed provision for proof to the satisfaction of the committee."
These rules provide that "no person shall be admitted to
the bar without a certificate from the proper committee,
that it has carefully investigated the character and fitness
of the applicant and that in such respect he is entitled to
admission." This committee is different from the one that
examines on the law. Kentucky has a rule similar to that
of New York and "all candidates must appear before this
separate committee and satisfy it of the character and fitness for admission to the bar." The state which has perhaps made the greatest progress in this direction and is
most effective is New Jersey. The rules of this state require a separate committee on character and fitness which
must be satisfied that the candidate is a person of good
character and fitted for the profession, and this committee
must certify the same to the court. There is a committee
for each county and the several committees must keep tab
on the candidates in their respective counties from the time
they register for the study of law until the time of their
admission to the bar. If any candidate goes wrong between the time of the bar examination and the time for
swearing him in, the court may decline to administer him
the oath, thus keeping out one more undesirable. This drastic change in the New Jersey rules was made only recently
June 5, 1923. New Jersey thus comes the nearest to using
methods adopted and in use by the church demoninations
noted above.
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Some one objects to the religious test of the questionaire on the ground of being contrary to the constitution and
the policy of this country. The objection is untenable. It
is not a religious test within the meaning of the constitution, neither is it contrary to the policy of the nation. The
constitution forbids discrimmination against religions. A
person who boasts of having no religion is a fit person for
the state to refuse admission to one of the learned professions where moral character is held at a premium or should
be. One who cares so little for the high ideals inculcated
by religion as not to accept and practice them is an unsafe
person to put as a leader in society. He might be able to
surmount the handicap and make good as a leader, but he
would succeed not because of want of religious ideals but
in spite of it. Such a one no doubt is impelled in his course
and succeeds more from a subconscious or unconscious reflexive influence of parental training or an aggregate of
influences that operated on his life; influences of the
church, schools, religious associations and literature. Society would be injured less by refusing admission of the nonreligious to the learned professions than it is in admitting
them. Mr. Wickersham refers to the ethical canons adopted
by the American Bar Association and observes that many
states require the reading and study of these canons by applicants for the bar. He says that it would be of greater
importance to have a knowledge of the Ten Commandments.
A college professor writing for some magazine makes the
statement that, "207 of the college student body today do
not know there is an Old Testament and a New Testament
constituting the Bible." An Iowa University professor by
test found that only 2% of the freshman and sophomore
classes,'men and women, knew who Saul was. If applicants
for admission to the bar are that ignorant of the Bible, the
source of all ethical, moral and religious principles, they
'had better be put to work at the beginning of their course
of study, at registration, and be required to undergo a severe test and the profession in a short time will be reaping
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the benefits in a higher standard in morals, and less frequent
disbarment proceedings. It would be better to have the
front door more rigidly guarded than have the back
door clogged trying to get them out. It is much easier to
refuse the unethical and unmoral admission to the bar than
to get them out once they are in.
E. A. HARPER
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MOOT COURT
EVANS VS. PENNSYLVANIA R. R. CO.
Negligence--Proof of Negligence Necessary to hold R. R. Co. Liable
for Fires Caused by its Engines-Duty of Crew to Assist in
Extinguishment-Liability Attaching from
Work of Supererogation.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Evans owned a house on land 200 feet from the defendant's
tracks. Between his land and the tracks, was a tract belonging to
one Blight on which was some combustible material which sparks
from a passing engine, set on fire. The train, running on schedule
time, delayed five minutes and all the hands assisted In fighting
the fire. They might have succeeded had they persisted ten or fifteen minutes longer. After their departure the fire spread to Evan's
land causing a loss of $2000. The plaintiff alleges negligence (a) in
causing the fire (b) in not persisting in the combat against it.
Schneck, for plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Heller, J. We are called upon in this case to answer two questions, first, whether the railroad company was negligent as to the
cause of the fire, and, second, whether the crew of the train were
negligent in not putting the fire out, after they had once started to
combat it. Also, coextensive with the second question, we are to decide, whether or not the negligence of the crew, if any existed, could
be imputed to the railroad company.
We are of the opinion that there was no negligence on the part
of the railroad company in causing the fire. At least the evidence
does not show nor can we infer from it any negligence on the part
of the defendant. In an action for loss by fire caused by sparks
from a locomotive engine of a railroad company, the burden is on
the plaintiff to prove that the fire was communicated by some engine of the defendant company and also to prove negligence in the
construction or management of the engine. Henderson vs. It R.
144 Pa. 461.
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The facts of the case prove that a spark from the defendant's
engine was the cause of the fire, but there is not one iota of evidence
to show that there was negligence in the construction or management
of the engine. The plaintiff does not show that the engine did not
have a spark arrester, nor does he prove that the engine was in any
way defective. The negligence or misconduct on the part of the defendant must be shown in order to render the railroad company liable
to one whose property has been destroyed, 29 Cyc. 462. The plaintiff having the burden of proof, must prove that the railroad company was negligent, and, in this, he has failed.
The allegation by the plaintiff that the crew was negligent In
not putting out the fire after they had started to fight the fire, is
baseless. Fighting fires is wholly without the scope of employment
existing between a railroad train crew and their employer. An employer is not liable for any act or omission of an employee that Is
not within the scope of his employment. It would indeed be disastrous to passengers, if the crew on passenger trains were under
a duty to fight fires caused by the trains of their employer. There
is no duty on a railroad company to render aid in putting out fires,
even though the sparks from the railroad's engine has set property
adjacent to their tracks, on fire. Nor can the railroad company be
held liable for a refusal of the crew to aid in preventing the spread
of such fires, because the extinguishment offered Is not within the
scope of their employment 262 Pa. 474.
Since a railroad company cannot be held liable for a refusal by
the crew to fight fires, they cannot be held liable for spread of
fires when the crew cease to fight the fires before they are extinguished. Even if the crew were negligent In fighting the fire, this
negligence could not be imputed to the railroad company because
the acts were not done within the scope of the crew's employment.
The duty of the crew Is to run the train and not to fight fires.
Therefore, since no negligence on the part of the railroad company
was proved, and the crew were under no duty to fight the fire, the
railroad company Is entirely without liability and we must give
judgment for the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
That sparks escaped from a passing engine was not sufficient
evidence of the want of a proper spark arrester or of the improper
management of the engine.
The fire was not caused by the negligence of the defendant.
It was not at all accountable for its existence. There was no more
of a duty on it to extinguish a fire caused without fault by its engine
than to extinguish one caused by an utterly alien agency.
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If the train was delayed to enable the hands to assist in the
extinction of the fire, a work of supererogation was done. It could
not create a duty to continue the effort at extinguishment until
success was attained.
The decision of the learned court below is affirmed.

RICHARDS VS. TOME
Bills and Notes-Notice of Protest Sent to Endorser-Efficacy of
Affidavit of Protest of Notary-Credit to be Given Bald
Denial of Receipt of Notice by Endorser-277
Pa. 27 Approved.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Tome endorsed a note for $1000, drawn by Jackson, and payable
to Richards. The note was not paid and this is a suit against the
endorser. The defense is that he received no notice of the maker's
failure to pay. The plaintiff put in evidence the certificate of the
notary, averring that he had duly sent notice to Tome. Tome denied that he had ever received notice and insists that in the face of
his denial, the Jury cannot be allowed to infer that the notice was
sent.
OPINION OF THE CO .IRT
Schneck, J. As it appears. the note in controversy is a nonnegotiable paper. The payee of the same is suelng the endorser,
Tome. The plaintiff has put in evidence the certificate of the notary averring that notice was sent to Tome and the defence Is a
bald denial of his ever having received notice.
It is a general rule of law that no notice need be given to the
endorser of a non-negotiable instrument, to charge the endorser
with his liability on his endorsement. The rules of demand, presentment and notice apply strictly to commercial paper. Jordan vs.
Hurst 12 Pa. 269; Cromwell vs. Hewett 40 N. Y. 491; 7 Cyc. 1066.
However we shall assume that the instrument is negotiable and
decide the sufficiency of the defendant's affidavit of defense. By
the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1901, Sec. 89, "When a negotiable instrument has been dishonored by non-acceptance or non-payment,
notice of dishonor must be given to the drawer and to each endorser,
and any drawer or endorser to whom such notice is not given Is discharged."
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The defendant in this case insists that no notice was given to
him of the maker's non-payment. Plaintiff has introduced in evidence the notary's certificate-which is prima facie evidence of notice-but which may be contradicted or rebutted.
Under our law a notary's certificate of protest is prima facte
evidence of the facts stated therein. The Act of Jan. 2, 1815, 6
Smith's Laws 238, which made the certificate of a notary prima facie evidence of the facts therein, was extended by the Act of Dec. 14,
1854 P. L.
724 so as to include notice to drawers, acceptors, and
endorsers in respect to dishonor of bills and promissory notes.
It is necessary then to prove demand, presentment and notice,
and to do this the plaintiff puts in evidence the notary's certificate that notice was sent of the dishonor.
Notice of dishonor or sending of protest was construed under
the Act of Jan. 2, 1815. Sec. 1, 3 Purdon's 3326, to be an official act
and was expressly included in the next legislation; Act of Dec. 14,
1854, 2 Purdon's 3327, making all notary's certificates prima facie
evidence. The question now is whether the defendant can overcome
or rebut this presumption by a mere denial.
The courts in this state have uniformly held that a bald denial
of receipt of notice is negative testimony of a very low probative
value at best. Zollner vs. Moffitt 222 'Pa. 644; Cook vs. Forker 193
Pa. 461; Bittenbender vs. Berger 277 Pa. 29; Moore vs. Somerset 6
Nas. 262.
It is not sufficient for the defendant to say that he had not received notice. He must state such facts as will justify the inference
that there was no notice sent. McConeghy vs. Kirk 68 Pa. 200.
If the defendant had offered to prove some direct fact which
would have tended to show that the essential requirements of the
act of assembly had not been performed either in protesting the
note or the giving of notice, the controverted facts might be left to
the jury but the condition which confronts the court is nothing but
a bald statement to prove that the defendant did not receiye the
notice. There was no fact offered which tended to show that the
notice was not duly received or that the notary or plaintiff had neglected to do anything which the law required them to do, which
resulted In defendant not receiving notice. We therefore think that
the proof of notice to defendants of non-payment was not sufficiently overcome or contradicted.
Then again, if the defendant assumes to contradict the presumption which was established, it would be a question of fact for
the jury to decide whether or not the defendant has contradicted the
plaintiff's evidence.
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In Zolner vs. Moffitt, 226 Pa. 40, Justice McElvane stated that
it is not for the court but for the Jury to say when a presumption
arising from a certificate is completely rebutted.
Therefore from either angle, whether the note be non-negotiable
or in considering the note negotiable, the defendant has no standing.
In passing we may remark that the defendant has labored under
a misconception of the facts of the- case.
Judgment for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
We have read the almost illegible opinion of the learned court
below with extreme difficulty.
The question is agitated, whether the note in controversy was
negotiable. If it was not negotiable, proof of the meaning of the
Indorsement would have been necessary. The law merchant has
defined the obligation assumed by the endorsement of a negotiable
bill or note, in the absence of evidence of a varying undertaking.
The endorser promises to pay the amount in the instrument, not if
the maker or acceptor cannot, not if he does not, but "if, demand on
him being made on the day of maturity, he does not pay, and further,
if notice of the non-payment is promptly given to the endorser.
No such interpretation can be put on the endorsement of a nonnegotiable instrument. It may mean a suretyship or a guaranty, or
something else and what it means would have to be shown. Cf. Shaftfstall vs. McDaniel, 162 Pa. 598; Leech vs. Hill, 4 W. N. C. 448. No
interpretation is offered iL this case. No recovery therefore could
be had were the note non-negotiable. Ineffectually making demand
on the maker on the maturing day, and instant notice to the endorser would create no liability.
The note in question must be taken to be negotiable, The de.
fendant is liable, as endorser, only if demand was made on the maturity of this note, and notice of non-payment was immediately transmitted. A notary has been employed to make the demand and to
give the notice. He has prepared a certificate of protest, affirming
such demand and notice. The act of assembly constitutes this certificate prima facie evidence, without the sworn testimony in court
of the notary.
It is susceptible of contradiction. That the things alleged by
the officer to have been done by him, were not done, there is no direct
proof. The defendant, arguing that if the notice had been sent by
the mails, it would have reached him, proves that it did not reach
him, and insists on the inference by the Jury that it was not sent,
or, if sent, was not properly stamped, or was not properly addressed.
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The failure of the addressee to receive. thru the malls, a letter
is some evidence that It was not sent. However it is not deemed
enough to nullify the explicit and official averment of the officer,
charged with the duty of notification and of proof of the notification.
A highly creditable testimony Is opposed by a less highly creditable
testimony to a fact, supposedly inconsistent with the fact averred
by the officer, but which fact is not certainly inconsistent with the
fact averred the officer. A bald denial of receipt of notice of protest is not sufficient to overcome the direct positive testimony, in
the certificate, that notice was sent. Bittenbender vs. Berger, 277
Pa. 27.
The judgment of the learned court below is affirmd.

HAMMETT VS. TURNER
Landlord and Tenant-Remedy of Wrongfully Dispossessed TenantActs of March 21, 1772, December 14, 1863, March
31, 1905-236 Pa. 61 Approved.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Turner let a house to Hammett for one year in 1912. Hammett
remained in possession for four years. One month before the expiration of the fourth year he was notified by Turner to vacate the
house at the end of the fourth year. Hammett not doing so, Turner began proceedings before a justice of the peace to eject him, and
the justice rendered judgment against Hammett and Issued a writ.
of possession by which he was expelled from the house. He did not
appeal. He brings this action of trespass alleging that he was improperly dispossessed because he did not receive the requisite notice
to quit.
Lieberman, for Plaintiff.
Handler, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE

COURT

of authority,
Miss Stroh, J. According to the great weight
where a tenant under a devise for a year or more, holds over at the
end of his term without any new agreement with his landlord, he
may be treated as a tenant from year to year. As authority for
this proposition in Pennsylvania, we have the case of Phoenixville
Boro. vs. Walters. 147 Pa- 501, cited by counsel for plaintiff, which
holds that a tenant who holds over becomes a tenant from year to
year, and cannot be required to quit at any time before the end of
the current year.
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It is also a fixed rule that to terminate a tenancy from year to
year, three months notice to quit before the end of the term, must
be given to the tenant. 122 Pa. 272; Trickett on "Landlord and
Tenant," page 304; 54 Pa. 186.
It is contended by counsel for plaintiff, and admitted by counsel for defendant, (1) that Hammett became a tenant from year to
year on his holding over after the first year; and (2) that the notice
given to him by Turner was insufficient. The quesction then, of sufficient notice, is undisputed, and we turn to the real question that
this case presents, viz,; Was Hammett's action of trespass for the
alleged wrongful eviction by Turner properly brought?
The defendant could have commenced the proceedings to recover possession of his land under any one of three acts providing
for dispossessory proceedings by landlords, viz.; the Act of March
21. 1772; the Act of December 14, 1863; or the Act of March 21, 1905.
We will summarize briefly each of these acts in order to determine
under which he did proceed.
The Act of December 14, 1863, 2 Purdon 2194, provides, "When
any person, having leased or demised any lands or tenements for
a term of one or more years, or at will, shall be desirous of termjnatIng the same, having given three months notice of such intention
to his lessee or tenant, and said lessee or tenant shall refuse to surrender up the said premises at the expiration of said term, it shall
be lawful for such lessor to complain to any justice, who shall sumprovided, that
mon the defendant to appear on a day certain -----the defendant may, within ten days from the judgment, appeal to
the common pleas."
The Act of March 21, 1772, 2 Purdon 2189, differs from the act
of 1863, in that in the former, the proceedings are brought before
two Justices and twelve jurors; and it does not give the right of appeal to the common pleas, as does the other &ct.
The Act of March 31, 1905, 5 Purdon 5632, applies only to tenancies for less than one year, or for an indeterminate term.
Upon a careful review of these three acts, it will appear clearly
that the defendant Turner must have proceeded under, the act of
1863. It is evident that he did not proceed under the act of 1772,
because he began his proceedings before one justice, not two; and
the justice himself rendered a judgment, Instead of its having been
rendered by a jury. Unless mistakenly, he would not have proceeded under the act of 1905, which does not apply to tenancies from
year to year.
Since, then. we see that the defendant proceeded under the
act of 1863, It is for us to decide whether Hammett could properly
bring trespass under that act.
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Sharswood, J.. in the case of Koontz vs. Hammond, 62 Pa. 177,
cited by counsel for the defendant here, said that the only remedy
provided for the tenant under the act of 1863 Is that of appeal generally. The court In Leese vs. Home, 47 *Pittsburgh Legal Journal, also cited by counsel for the defendant, said, "The act of 1863
provides for an appeal, and if upon appeal the jury shall find for
the defendant, they shall also assess the damages which he shall
have sustained by removal from the premises. If the tenant wishes
to claim damages, his remedy is by appeal."
It was held in McClelland vs. Patterson 10 Atl. Rep. 475, that a
judgment of possession in favor of the landlord is conclusive and a
defense to an action of trespass based on the execution of the writ
of possession.
We are of the opinion then, that Hammett's remedy is exclusively by appeal from the judgment of the justice, and that his
action of trespass for the alleged wrongful eviction by Turner was
improper.
Judgment for Defendant.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
Is affirmed.
The judgment of the learned court below
Schwab vs. Schneider, 236 Pa. 61, with the other cases cited.

Cf.

COMIONWEALTH VS. MULFORD
lanslaughter--ConConstitutional Law-Murder and Involuntary
viction of Involuntary Manslaughter After Acquittal of
Murder for Same Killing-271 Pa. 95 Approved.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mulford was indicted for murdering X, and was acquitted. He
was then indicted for involuntary manslaughter of X, the same
killing being intended, aj in the earlier case. He pleaded "autrefois" acquittal and exhibited the record and furnished proof that
the killing now alleged was the same killing. The Court allowed the
jury to convict of involuntary manslaughter.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Barrata, J.
" No person shall, for the same offense, be twice put in jeopaxdy
of life or limb," Article 5, U. S. Constitution. Authorities seem
agreed that the meaning of this clause at common law was that
a man once tried and acquitted could not be retried for the same
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offense. Cooley, 325; Kent, Vol. 2, P. 112; Wharton, Commentaries
of Am. Law, 562. Both reason and authority dictate that the incorporators of this clause into the U. S. Constitution used it with
this meaning. Kepner vs. U. S.. 195 U. S. 100. The Pennsylvania
Sec.
contains the same clause. Article 1,
State Constitution
10. It seems to have been copied verbatim. If the framers of the
U. S. Constitution are chargeable with having used the clause with
the above meaning, then a fortiori the framers of the Pennsylvania
Constitution are so chargeable since the state document came several years later than the U. S. document.
Counsel have taken issue on the clause in the State Constitution discussed above. Irrespective of any questions of pleading
or practice that may have arisen at the trial or in the submission
of their briefs, and which may be contained therein, we shall consider the case in the light of the point raised in their argument.
namely, whether in the face of Article 1, See. 10, State Constitution,
the conviction of Mulford of involuntary manslaughter can be sustained. We have shown the meaning intended by the framers of
Article 1. Sec. 10, Pennsylvania Constitution was that a person
once tried and acquitted could not be tried again for the same
offense. The defendant was tried twice for the same offense, for
the killing Is the offense whether we call the killing murder or involuntary manslaughter. The attendant circumstances of the killing determine its punishment, and the names, murder and involuntary manslaughter, are merely labels for the punishment to be
meted out. Basically and fundamentally the killing always remains
the offense. 'and the offense here Is one and the same killing. Irrespective of any rulings to the contrary which may have been
made heretofore, where a man has been tried and acquitted on an
indictment for murder, he cannot be proceeded against again on
an indictment for involuntary manslaughter where the killing in the
murder indictment and in the involuntary manslaughter indictment
are one and the same.
The argument contained in this opinion seems to us sufficient
reason for so holding.
Other collateral reasons urge us to this view. The State is a
is comparatively
great and powerful institution. The individual
weak. Why should an individual have to be subjected to two trials
growing out of one basic fact? Why should he be made to bear the
additional expense of another trial? Why should he have to keep his
evidence and witnesses ever ready to answer the whim of the State
which may bring the second trial at any time within the statuatory
period of limitations for bringing such second action? Why cannot
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the whole controversy be settled in the one action? It is no defense
to the State to say that certain technicalities prevent such a course.
That is the State's problem and it knows where the remedy lies.
The prisoner is accordingly discharged.

OPINION

OF SUPREME COURT

"No person shall, for the same offence, be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb," says the Constitution of Pennsylvania, Art. 1, sec.
10.
A crime does not consist of the physical act but of this act and
circumstances, motives, etc. A kills B by accident. No punishable homicide has occurred. A kills B with intention, but in selfdefence. Again no punishable act has occurred. A kills B with
malice and with intention to kill. He is a murderer. A kills without malice but with attendalt circumstances which make the act
involuntary manslaughter. The crime is not the killing but the
killing with circumstances a, b and c, or the killing with circumstances d, e and f.
The defendant has killed but has been accused, not simply of
killing, but of killing with malice and with intention to kill. These circumstances are a part of the crime. He has been acuitted not
because he has not killed, but because he had no malice" in doing the
act.
But, the killng may have been accompanied by other circumstances which turn it into something other than murder; into
involuntary manslaughter.
In the trial for murder,
found guilty of involuntary
ure to convict him of that
quittal, and a trial for the
been prohibited.

the accused was in no danger of being
manslaughter. Had he been, the failoffence would have been a virtual acinvoluntary manslaughter Would have

The auestion before the court has been considered in Commonwealth vs. Greenz, 75 Super 116. where the court decided that an
acquittal of murder precluded a later trial for involuntary manslaughter. The decision was reversed by the Supreme Court in
271 Pa. 95, and for reasons that we deem adequate.
The decision of the learned court below is reversed.
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CHASE VS. CARR
Statute of Frauds--Act of April 23d, 1909, P. L. 137-Defeasance to
Deeds Required to be in Writing-Criticism of the Act271 Pa. 117, 230 Pa. 475 .Followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Chase. borrowing $2,000 from Carr, executed a conveyance of
his farm, worth $8,000, to Carr. It was orally agreed that the land
should be held by Carr as security for the repayment of the loan,
within five years. The debt was not repaid till eight years after
when the $2.000 and interest, were tendered to Carr and a demand
was made for a reconveyance. There was no deception or fraud in
the making of the conveyance. The only fraud alleged is the refusal
of Carr to make the reconveyance.
Einhorn, for Plaintiff.
Bielchowuky, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Gans, J. The oral agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant was that the land in question should be held by the defendant as security for the repayment of the money loaned by the defendant to the plaintiff. This of course means that upon the contingency of the plaintiff repaying the loan, the sum of $2,000, within five years of the date of the agreement, that the defendant would
in turn execute a reconveyance of the land to the plaintiff. This
parole agreement contemplates a reversion of the property to the
plaintiff and so it may properly be said that the parties contemplated that the agreement should be a defeasance.
A defeasance Is thus defined by Blackstone, 3 Commentaries
227, "A collateral deed made at the same time with the feofment or
conveyance containing certain conditions upon the performance
of which the estate then created may be defeated or undone, totally."
It has thus been decided that the transaction could not be anything other than a defeasance. The question now arises whether
this oral defeasance has the effect of reducing the deed from the
plaintiff to the defendant, to a mortgage in view of the Act of June
8, 1881 'P. L. 84, as amended by the Act of April 23, 0i909. P. L. 137.
"No defeasance to any deed for real estate regular and absolute upon Its face, made after the passage of this act, shall have
the effect of reducing it to a mortgage, unless the said defeasance
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Is in writing, signed and delivered by the grantee, in
the grantor."

the deed, to

There are many cases before the acts as well as after it deciding the same as the cases later, a few of which we have perused.
defeasance in
46 Pennsylvania 331, Guthrie vs. Kahle. The
this case was in writing but it had not been recorded and it was
decided that this would not reduce the deed to a mortgage.
7Watts and Sargent 335, Manufactures and Mdchanics Bank
vs. Bank of Pennsylvania, decided in 1844. Here the defeasance
was also written but not recorded and It was held the same way.
17 Sargent and Rawle 70, Freidly vs. Hamilton. The facts
were similar to those at bar and In this case the learned court held
that the defeasance would not reduce the deed to a mortgage.
Since the acts and relying on the acts are the following:Sankey vs. Hawley, 118 Pennsylvania 30. Here the defeasance
was written but not recorded and it was decided that the deed was
valid.
133 Pennsylvania 41,.1Molly vs. Ulrich. decided in 1890. The
case was very similar to the case in question, the contract being
parole, and the plaintiff was denied relief, the court relying on the
Act of 1881.
213 Pennsylvania 551, O'Donnell vs. Vandersal. There was an
agreement established, though not in writing, and it was held that
This case was decided in
a reconveyance could not be enforced.
1906.
Dismissing the possibility of laches on the part of the plaintiff, it is the judgment of this court that the defeasance does not
reduce the deed to a mortgage In-as-much as there is no compliance with the Act of 1881.
bill
In
195 Pennsylvania 648, McDonald vs.
Sturtevant. A
equity for the recoverance of the land on the ground that the deed
was in fact a mortgage, was dismissed where there was no satisfactory evidence to show that there was any written defeasance against
the absolute deed.
It is the judgment of this court that the deed executed by the
plaintiff to the defendant vested In the said defendant all the Interes of the plaintiff and that even conceding that there was a
defeasance as claimed by the plaintiff it would not now change
the legal right of the parties as such defeasance would be Inoperative under the Act of June 8, 1881, Pamphlet Laws 84.
The plaintiffs then are not entitled
and their bill is dismissed.

to the

relief prayed for,
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OPINION

OF SUPREME COURT

The act of April 23. 1909; P. L. 137, enacts that no defeasance
to any deed, regular and absolute on its face, shall have the effect
of reducing it to a mortgage, unless the said defeasanee is in writing
and delivered to the grantor by the grantee.
It has sometimes been said that statutes requiring certain agreements to be In writing and making them void if not written, accomplish frauds, as well as prevent fraud. This is true of the
act of 1909. The land conveyed was worth $8,000. It was conveyed for the purpose of securing payment of a debt of onefourth that amount, $2.000, within five years. Eight years have
elapsed and the debtor is now tendering the $2,000 with interest.
The act of 1909 makes it impossible for him to compel a reconveyance. The defeasance was oral, not written; it was then not signed
signed and delivered to the grantor by the grantee.
To permit' enforcement of the defeasance would be to refuse
submission to the will of the legislature. A huge inequity Is being
perpetrated but the court is constitutionally bound to execute the
legislative will. Cf. Rhoades vs. Good, 271 Pa. 117; Stewart vs.
Stewart, 230 Pa. 475. However reluctantly we must assist in the
perpetration of a gross Injustice because Chase did not know of,
or did not remember the act of 1909, or did not take pains to insist
on a compliance with its terms.
The judgment of the learned court below is affirmed.

COMMONWEALTH VS. COLLINS
Obtaining a Check by False Pretense--Act of May 31, 1860. P.
382-Elxercise of Prudence by the Deceived not Essential
-- 69 Super. 176, 78 Super. 176, 22 Pa. 176 Approved.

L.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Collins, acting for Z, owner of an automobile, induced X to
purchase it by falsely representing that it had travelled only 100
miles, and was In good working condition. X did not inspect the
car, and being entirely Inexpert, would not have relied upon his
own judgment. The car was in fact much worn and had travelled 500
miles. In payment of this, X was induced to give a check for
$500.00, payable to Z. X has stopped the payment of the check.
This is an indictment for obtaining the check by false pretenses.
Bittle, for Commonwealth.
Hoerle, for Defendant.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
Mundy, J. The act of May 31. 1860, P. L. 382. provides that,
"If any person shall, by any false pretense, obtain the signature
of any person to any written instrument-with Intent to cheat
and defraud any person of the same, every such offender shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor, etc."
There can be no doubt that Collins made a false assertion of
an existing fact, with knowledge at the time that it was untrue,
intending to defraud X by means of it. Any person, excepting one
entirely inexpert in the matter of automobiles, would have perceived
that the car was not worth $500.00, that it had travelled more than
100 miles and that it was not only not in "good working condition"
but was in fact "much worn."
X was under no duty to inspect the car. Had he done so. being so ignorant of the worth of automobiles, he would not have
relied upon his own judgment; and since he solicited the opinion
of no third person concerning the car, we are to presume that he
confided in the representations of his vendor.
that the check that Collins induced X to give
the car was payable to Z. "The person making
may obtain the money or other thing not for
principal." Trickett, Law on Crimes in Penn53; 66 Pac. 1005.
Nor is the fact that payment on the check was stopped vital.
Its mere obtainment was sufficient to bring the defendant within
at that
being
accomplished
the terms of the act, the offense
point, 157 Pac. 412.
No reason for quashing the indictment is known to us. The
It matters not
1im in payment of
the representation
himself but for a
sylvania, Vol. 1, P.

motion is

dismissed.
OPINION

OF SUPREME

COURT

The statute which the defendant is alleged to have violated
states, "If any peron shall, by any false pretense, obtain the signature of any person to any written instrument, (or shall obtain
from any other person, any chattel, money, or valuable security
with Intent to cheat and defraud any person of the same), such
offender shall be guilty of a misdemeanor etc. 1 Purdon 949.
The pretense here alleged is the assertion that the automobile had travelled only 100 miles whereas it had travelled 500 miles;
that it was in good working condition, whereas it was much worn.
The thing induced by the pretense, was the execution by the
prosecutor, of a check, with his signature, and the delivery of the
check to the defendant. We think the act Is within the definition
of the statute.
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That the defendant was acting for another, who was possibly
the only person to be benefited by the fradulent representation,
is immaterial. A man, A, may defraud X, for the purpose of benefiting Y, and such fraud is within the scope of the statute, Commonwealth vs. Altieri, 78 Super. 80; Commonwealth vs. KoEune, 69
Super. 176.
We attribute no force to the suggestion that the false pretense
alleged should not have deceived the prosecutor. He did not inspect the car. His complete inexpertness in respect to automobiles
would have made inspection by him useless. As Henderson, 3. says
in Commonwealth vs. KoEune, 69 Super. 176, in a case in which the
prosecutor signed a paper without reading it. "The statute was not
enacted for the protection of the shrewd and capable only." It is
no less a false pretense because the party Imposed on, by the exercise of common prudence, might have avoided the imposition.
Commonwealth vs. Henry, 22 Pa. 253.
The judgment of the learned court below is affirmed.

Cf.

VAN DERBILT VS. NEVILLE
Promissory Note-Duty of Payee to Realize on Collateral Security
Before Sueing on Note-Pleading-Contract as to Collateral Security as a Defence--271 Pa. 145 Approved
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Neville borrowed $1700 from the plaintiff and gave him a note
for repayment in six months from April 17, 1923. On the same
paper and following the note, was a statement that a bond of the
State of Pennsylvania for $1000 had been deposited with Vanderbilt as collateral security. The plaintiff gave no evidence respecting this bond. Neville argued that it was Vanderbilt's duty to obtain what he could for the bond and to sue only for the balance
of the debt. The court allowed the recovery of $1700.
Auker, for Plaintiff.
Halliday, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Irwin, J. The case as presented is that of the payee of a promissory note, with whom has been deposited as collateral security, a
bond, sueing on the note, having failed to realize first on the bond
and failing to give any evidence at all concerning it. Is such procedure proper in Pennsylvania?
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In the absence of express agreement, what is the legal effect
of the giving of collateral security in addition to a promissory
note? Is it a course pursued by the debtor in order to protect himself from suit on the note or Is it, in reality, a measure of self-protection insisted upon by the payee when accepting the note? Unquestionably it is the latter. By taking collateral security the payee
does not bind himself to realize first on it and then sue for the
balance. As a pre-condition to the lending of the money he impliedly says, "Your personal promise to repay is not sufficient and
in addition thereto, as another remedy in case of need, I will require additional security." He does not, by accepting such additional protection, bind himself to realize first on the collateral and
then sue on the note. His remedies are cumulative, and he may
choose either to sue directly on the note or to sell first the collateral and hold the maker for any deficiency. Suppose the bond, after
pledging, became practically worthless and not readily marketable.
Must the payee incur the inconvenience and expense of realizing on
the bond before sueing? We think not
The parties may, by express agreement, bind the payee to sell
the collateral before sueing the maker but in, this case we find no
such agreement. Mere acceptance of collateral security does not
create any such duty.
The case in 211 Pa. 148, cited by the counsel for the defendant
as a case affirming his argument, does not so decide. It holds that
the payee may first sell the collateral and sue for the balance, not
that he must first sell it.
The plaintiff has cited several cases upholding his contention,
We find them to be correctly stated. Our courts have from earliest
times held the doctrine to be as we have stated. See 1 W. N. C.
330, 2 W. N. C. 67, 3 W. N. C. 94, 262 Pa. 28, 87 Pa 394
See also
Jones, Collateral Security (3rd) Sec. 685, 686.
Nor is the plaintiff bound to put in evidence any collateral
agreement as to holding of the bond. He makes out a prima facie
case by showing the note and non-payment thereof. If there has
been any express agreement that the collateral be held in such a
way as to prevent a prior recovery on the note, that is purely a
matter of defence and must be pleaded and proved by the defendant. The recently decided case of Harper vs. Lukens in 271 Pa.
145 is the latest expression of the law on this subject.
This holding is not unduly harsh nor inequitable to the defendant. If the plaintif attempts to enforce his judgment. for the
amount of the note without first relinguishing the bond held as
collateral, the defendant may apply to the court for a stay of exe-
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cution which would doubtless be
ly harassing the defendant.
Thus the law laid down above
decisions of the state and by the
We, therefore, remit the case
firm its judgment.
OPINION

granted were the plaintiff unjustis sanctioned both by the previous
principles of justice.
to the learned court below and af-

OF SUPREME COURT

The judgment of the learned court below is affirmed.

SNYDER

VS. HENDERSON

Act of January 2, 1815, 3 Pur. 3326-Certificate of Acknowledgment
of Notary as Evidence--Evidence of Fraud-Refutation
of Notary's Certificate-224 Pa. 455 Approved.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Scire facias sur mortgage. The defense is that the mortgage
it. Three
is a forgery. Henderson denied that he had executed
and that
signed
mortgage
the
saw
they
that
persons testified
of
the defendant was not the signer, but that the brother-in-law
defendant
the
of
wife
The
signer.
real
the defendant was the
personate her husband
testified that she had induced her brother to
the certificate of a
had
in executing the mortgage. The mortgage
appeared before
had
Henderson,
mortgager,
named
the
notary that
below refused
him and acknowledged the instrument. The court
of the actual
evidence
sufficient
was
certificate
to charge that this
Verdict for Henderexecution of the mortgage by Henderson (1).
son. The plaintiffs assign (1) as error.
OPINION OF THE COURT
is whether the
Wollen, J. The sole question to be decided here
evidence of
conclusive
or
sufficient
was
notary
the
of
certificate
the actual execution of the mortgage.
Act of January 2, 1815,
The counsel for plaintiff relies upon the
acts of a notary may
3 Pur. 3326 which provides that the official
the facts certified to
prove
to
evidence,
In
be read and received
however, that any party
by the notary. The act further provides,
certificate.
such
any
evidence,
may contradict, by other
that the acknowheld
have
cases
Pennsylvania
Numerous
act and the certifijudicial
a
is
ledgement of a deed or mortgage
as to the facts
conclusive
Is
fraud,
of
absence
the
cate of it, in
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stated therein. It is prima facie evidence of the due execution of
the instrument, but may be rebutted, however.
Parole evidence may be introduced to show that fraud was practised, both in the execution of the deed or mortgage and in the
acknowledgment of it. Pusic vs. Solak 261 Pa. 512; Cover vs. Manaway 115 Pa. 338; Hecter vs. Glassglow 79 Pa. 83; Williams vs.
Baker 71 Pa. 476.
It seems quite clear to us that fraud was resorted to in order
to secure the execution of the mortgage and the acknowledgment
of it. The very testimony of Mrs. Henderson, that she induced
her brother to personate her husband, is sufficient proof of that
fraud.
If that is not enough, however, there is the testimony of the
three witnesses. They, having seen the person sign and knowing
that he was not Henderson, who was the right person to sign, testified so. This raises a quite clear and sufficient presumption of
fraud, which is enough of itself to uphold the defense of forgery.
The witnesses knew both the defendant and his brother-in-law
and could therefore testify competently to facts distinctly remembered. In an action to set aside an instrument for fraud, a witness
and
distinctly remembered
is competent if he testifies to facts
accurately stated, 221 Pa. 171.
In view of the facts as presented in this case, this court is
clearly of the opinion that the lower court did not err in refusing
to charge as the plaintiff requested.
Judgment affirmed.
OPINION

OF SUPREME COURT

The sole question is, did Henderson execute the mortgage. He
denies that he did. Three others who saw the mortgage signed say
that the signer was not Henderson and identified him as a brotherin-law of Henderson. The wife of the latter admits that she induced
her brother to personate Henderson.
Against this evidence is the implied declaration in the certificate of the notary, that Henderson was the acknowledger, and
hence, the signer.
How can we hold the certificate conclusive of its averment?
It is doubtless prima facie evidence. Perhaps it is strong evidence.
It is not necessary to concede that it is. In any case it must be
susceptible of refutation. It is possible for a personation to take
place before the notary and for him to be unacquainted with the
personator or the person personated. Hence his certificate may
be erroneous. Justice forbids the making of the fraud successful
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because of the ignorance of the notary. It was then for the Jury
to decide on the evidence, whether Henderson, In fact, acknowledged
the mortgage. Cf. Gustave vs. Westenberger, 224 Pa. 455.
The judgment of the learned court below Is affirmed.

AMOS VS. KUNKLE
Married Women-M1arried Women's Contaetual Capacity-Surety
for Her Husband-Act of June 8, 1893, 3 Pur. 2451-236
Pa. and 254 Pa. 32 Distinguished.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Kunkle gave a note for $1,000, which contained the statement
that it was for a loan of $1,000 made to Mary Kunkle which she
was intending to use in
improving
her separate
estate- She
owned a town lot. on which, she told Amos, she was about to erect
a house. Amos lent the money In reliance on this statement. In
fact Mrs. Kunkle did not intend to build a house. She gave the
money borrowed to her husband as a loan. Judgment has been entered on the warrant of attorney in the note. This is an application
to the court to open the judgment and set it aside, since she was
a mere surety for her husband.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Kernan, J. The Question to be
determined in the case Is
whether Mrs. Kunkle was a surety for her husband or whether she
was a principal debtor on thie note. The answer Is to be determined by the construction which is placed upon Sections One and
Two of the Act of June 8, 1893 know as the Married Woman's Act;
which provides-Section 1---"Hereafter a married woman shall have
the same right as an unmarried person to acquire, own, possess,
control, use, lease, sell etc.butshe may not mortgage or convey her
real property unles her husband join in such mortgaging or conveyancing." The obvious intent of this section was to give a
femme covert the same rights and control over her property, as
though she were a femme sole, with the exception of mortgaging or
conveyanclng.
endorser,
accomodation
Section 2-She may not become an
maker, guarantor or surety for another, and she may not execute
or acknowledge a deed or other written Instrument, conveying or
mortgaging her real property unless her husband join In such mortgage or conveyance.
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The defendant's case Is centered upon one of the enumerated
defenses in Section 2, namely, that a wife cannot be surety for her
husband.
He also cites the case of Keystone Brewery Co. vs. Verzally, 39
Sup. 155, in which it was held, "where the object of the Instrument
is to obtain money for the use of another person, it is not binding
on the maker who is a married woman, notwithstanding it may
appear on Its face to be her note for the payment of money."
Were that all that appeared in this case there is no doubt but
that the defendant would be entitled to have this judgment opened.
In Oswald vs. Jones, 254 Pa. 42, cited by the defendant It was
held--"When the wife receives no benefit whatever from the money
borrowed she is under no obligation to pay, either moral or legal."
This we think is a very erroneous decision, because, there would
be numerous cases of deceit and fraud arising since there would
be nothing to prevent her from saying "I received no benefit. Why
should I pay?"
Such, we think, is not the law.
At the inception of this note Mrs. Kunkle stated that It was
for the purpose of building a home upon property which she owned
and upon those representations, received a loan.
She now asserts that she never had such an intention. We
think she should not be permitted to do this, and therefore we find
that she is estopped to deny that she was a principal debtor.
Judgment for the plaintiff affirmed.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The act of June 8. 1893, 3 Purd. 2451, declares that "a married
woman may, in the same manner and to the same extent, as an unmarried person, make any contract, etc, but she may not become
accomodation indorser. maker, guarantor, or surety for another."
The note made by her is binding, unless, In making it, she was a
guarantor or surety.
What is a surety? We may adopt, as the-approprIate definition, that of 32 Cyc., p. 14. "Suretyship is a legal relation based
upon contract between competent parties, in which one person
undertakes, as the object of such contract, to answer to another,
for the debt, default or miscarriage of a third person; the third person's liability to the second person being thus similar to that of
such first person. A surety is the person collaterally liable for the
payment or performance by another."
The case before us discloses no liability of the husband of defendant, or of any other person, to which that of the defendant
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is collateral. The wife did not become bound to pay if he made
default. She was not a surety, nor was she a guarantor.
She borrowed the $1.O000, not the husband. She alone was responsible for its repayment. When she got the money she could
do with it what she chose to do. She could give it or lend it to
her husband. Such use of it could not retroact on the transaction,
so as to transform it from what it was, a simple borrowing by the
woman alone, into a suretyship for the husband.
The fact that she misrepresented to the loaner her purpose as
to the use she would make of the money, has no significance. She
could not refuse to repay It because she did not use it, as she said
she would.
The suggestion of Justice Stewart, in Murray vs. McDonald,
236 Pa. 26, that, if a married woman is In fact a surety, she contracts no liability by falsely saying to the creditor that she is
not, has no relevancy here. In that case, the single bill was that
of both husband and wife. She was In fact a surety. Her liability,
if such there were, would be collateral to his.
Oswald vs. Jones, 254 Pa. 32, is a judicial extension of the legislative prohibition. The wife was not a surety or guarantor, but
she was declared unable to bind herself, because the money lent
to her was Intended to be given or lent by her, to her husband,
and the lender had notice of the intention. This case does not
contain those elements.
The judgment of the learned court below is affirmed.

